British & French Acquiescence


By Editor in Chief: Ali Kassem
عنوان البريد الإلكتروني هذا محمي من روبوتات السبام. يجب عليك تفعيل الجافاسكربت لرؤيته.
The French and British acceptance to increase their aggressive forces to compensate for the shortfall resulting from America's decision to withdraw some of its troops from Syria was not surprising or out of the expected context since that both countries did not hide their ambitions on the one hand, or nostalgia for the colonial past on the other hand. At the same time, they did never have the courage to reject an American request that is used to be a part of the tax of the marginalized role of the European policy in recent decades.
In the recent era, Britain and France were competing for the post of US postman for the requirements of the American wars, with all the necessities of presence on the ground or in the corridors of politics and media. Under this title, they adopt a suspicious and conspiratorial role at all times and most blatantly exposed, up to accept functional roles within the system of the American hegemony. These role are not accepted by the quasi-states, or even by the "micro" countries that need a geographical microscope to be noticed on the map or on the emerging geographical and political maps.
The transition in the British and French roles is not a restoration of the colonial role in its traditional form. It does not touch the role of the international scene. It is often a weak and subordinate role (reached to the point of acquiescence) for the Americans. Despite the attempts to reincarnate the colonial role, the maximum of their achievements remain as a role in the orbit of the absolute subordination to the US and its wishes. They were a part of the tools of functional hegemony devoting the existing equation that Europe has gotten out of the circle of influence in the international politics, and turned, in the extreme cases, to a soft performer that accepts fragile roles, which the marginal countries don't take.
The big dilemma remains in the illusions that the political class in both countries trade, trying to paint a virtual picture of roles that reshape the past with wishes, despite the realization that the past has gone forever, and despite the attempt to hold on to contemporary illusions. All of these are just a search for pretexts for being submissive, and in the best cases, they remain an appeal to a role that Europe exaggerated in its subordination to the American policy.
The American presence or absence is not the product of a purely American desire, as it is the outcome of circumstances and factors that forced it to seek for exits. If America saw the scales in its favor, it would not think of the French and British, and it wouldn't ask them for troops it perceive that their tax will be humanly and politically expensive. Also, the American presence doesn't similar to any others' presence. Britain and France cannot fill, at minimum, the gap that will be caused by the American absence or diminished presence.
It is more serious that the difference is not limited to the roles and the ability to match their objectives, or the political weight embodied by the American presence, which is missing by both of the French and British sides. It is also not related to the colonial legacy that accumulates the French and British errors, but in the confrontation that imposes itself on the presence of the French and British occupation. It is a confrontation that may have been postponed for some time as a result of equations and calculations in which conditions played the main role. However, it will ultimately impose its rhythm, as the French and British cannot bear the burden and the heavy human, economic and political price they have to pay.
Translated by Amal Suleiman Ma'rouf