By Editor in Chief: Ali Kassem
عنوان البريد الإلكتروني هذا محمي من روبوتات السبام. يجب عليك تفعيل الجافاسكربت لرؤيته.
Building on the results of bilateral and non-bilateral meetings, is no longer good for drawing conclusions and analyses. It is often necessary to take some time to process the results, which can be understood in terms of the Russian-Turkish meeting, though its first indications leaving no doubt about the size of the gap between the approach of both sides to the issues and their fight against terrorism and what's related proven by the fact that diplomacy seemed incapable of closing the gap between the two sides.
While the details attached with the leaks and later the facts on the ground came to assure that what is shown by the platforms remain very different from what is going on in the closed rooms. Operations on the ground are proceeding at their usual pace in the face of terrorist organizations, so that the Russian side was able to pull the Turkish to the cuff that it is certain about being the right way to face the threat of terrorism, despite the Turkish growl and its repressed resentment.. !!
W e are not going to make an inventory about the winner and loser, because the issue is not related to its political criteria and assumptions, but rather to the title of the meeting, which seemed to be a meeting of postponement, and perhaps more migration of problems and differences more than being effective in resolving them. It was closer to be agreeing to postpone or withdraw controversial topics, evidenced by the additions, which came from outside the agenda of the summit and they are much more than those listed, and which were promoted by the Turkish regime, namely the developments in Idlib, and the repugnant talk about the dangers posed to the Turkish national security, which reproduces the American regional crooked concept.
The field scene and its contiguous edges, which emerged hours after the Moscow summit, illustrate the strategic difference between crisis deportation and postponement of disputes. In the first, the crisis is worsening to chronic escape, sometimes. In the second, there is an approach that realigns positions on a strategic basis, without affecting principles in their bold headlines.
The Turkish exit from the American pierced enclave, from the Sukhoi gate, after the S400 window poses the problem of a chronic relationship in betting on time, and reproduces the existential questions of Turkish alliances that often seemed more illusory, and in some of them seemed to rely on the political vacuum that produced by the Turkish regime in its components, and on the search for a pretext to escape the crises ravaging its options, to the extent that most of them are burdened, and pushed it, in the final outcome, to the west and east empty-handed besides its setbacks in the internal and external alliances.
The political intransigence does not mean staying entrenched behind positions, as much as it is a clear decision to resolve what is postponed across the field, until it can separate what is postponed from the what is migrated. This can be understood from the final conclusions of the Russian-Turkish summit, otherwise it is nothing more than a misinterpretation, or a conclusion with on political or field coverage, waiting for what the messages signed by the field achievements and the limits of political value at the table of Sochi or Astana halls, which remain shadowed by the hills of Idlib and its returning green, and it may be the time then.
Translated by Amal Suleiman Ma'rouf